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Surprise in Military systems and Diplomatic Systems:
Similarities and differences.
Exemplary event:
Military Surprise – The Yom-Kippur War in 1973 and Diplomatic
Surprise - Peace Initiative of Anwar Sadat, Egyptian President in
1977.
.This paper was submitted as the
thesis for Master Diploma.
M.A degree By:
Anat Klumel
This
study was carried out under the supervision of :
Dr. Shimon Naveh
Tel-Aviv
University , Social Science Faculty
, Security .Studies Program
Abstract
This
thesis examines the concept of surprise in military systems and in
diplomacy systems, and the difference between these systems.
The basic premise
is that there is a connection between the failure in methodology
discourse and the element of surprise.
Stagnation in
military and diplomatic concepts leads to a misleading
interpretation of political and military reality. The element of
surprise is a result of the discrepancy between reality and the
world of ideas.
The framework
for this concept is the systemic approach, which is based on the
concept of “Operational art” - “Intermediate field of
military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics”.
This concept
presents a theoretical framework for understanding the process of
knowledge acquirement and the methodology for understanding enemy
systems. The starting point for researching these systems is that
surprise is a failure resulting from a lack of communication between
the different network elements.
In addition,
this theoretical methodology examines the concept of the perception
of reality from the point of view of the individual and of military
intelligence.
This thesis
examines the concept of surprise in all its aspects, psychological,
information science, strategy, diplomacy and military theory.
Researching
surprise is compiled from the point of view of the object of the
surprise, which includes the components of surprise, the objectives
reasons for using surprise, the means of application and the
advantages and disadvantages.
Analyzing the
concept of surprise within a systems framework is based on the case
of the Yom Kippur war in 1973, and Anwar Sadat’s Peace Initiative in
1977.
The thesis
examines military and diplomatic discourse in Egypt, the Initiator
of the surprise, and the State of Israel, the object of the
surprise, during the period 1973 –1977.
This analysis
includes examining the regime; and the concept of leadership in each
regime and the systems discourse based on the concept of Egypt’s and
Israel’s security prior to the Yom Kippur war and the Peace
Initiative.
The
conclusion of this thesis is that the similarity between the two
military and diplomatic systems is greater than the difference.
In both these
cases, surprise is the expression of the state’s foreign policy,
which is based on the principle of profit and loss. This expresses
the discrepancy between the perception of reality and reality itself
in the eyes of the surprised object. The strategic value depends on
the revealed discrepancy in the evolving thought patterns resulting
from the surprise. Moreover, the common denominator for utilizing
military or diplomatic surprise is a static state of affairs, a
period of political stagnation. Egypt initiated the Yom Kippur war
and the Peace Initiative after a period of no change in political
affairs.
In both these
instances, the decision making process in the use of surprise occurs
in an autocratic regime under the leadership of Anwar Sadat, when
the power of his control was at its peak and he was therefore able
to undertake bold decisions without opposition.
From Israel’s
point of view, it seems that the tension between the military and
diplomatic systems suppressed the concept of security and no
attention was paid to the dual and simultaneous inclination in the
opposition camp, for both peace and war.
The Israel
military is dominant and its weight in the decision making process
in the Israeli Cabinet is central.
This framework
prevents the development of any discourse and causes the suppression
of any bold diplomatic and military initiative. This resulted in the
systems failure of the Yom Kippur war, whose significance was the
use of the military option and giving up any diplomatic solution,
and also generated the peace initiative.
This
paper shows that the prevention of military or diplomatic surprises
can facilitated only through the creation of an open dynamic
discourse, and a revolutionary change in the concepts governing our
security and foreign policy.
thesis
information:
מחבר: קלומל, ענת
כותר: הפתעה במערכת צבאית ובמערכת דיפלומטית : הדומה והשונה :
מקרה מדגים: הפתעה צבאית - הפתעת מלחמת יום הכיפורים ב-1973, והפתעה
דיפלומטית - יוזמת השלום של נשיא מצרים אנואר סאדאת ב-1977 /ענת קלומל
; בהדרכת נוה שמעון
מו"ל: [תל-אביב] :
[חמו"ל], 2002
תיאור: 170, [3] ד’ :איורים
שפה: HEB
מנחה-תיזה: נוה, שמעון (מנחה)
מוסד: אוניברסיטת תל-אביב. התכנית ללמודי בטחון (תואר שני)
הערה: בראש השער: אוניברסיטת תל-אביב, הפקולטה למדעי החברה, החוג
למדעי המדינה, החוג ללימודי ביטחון
Added abstract and t.p. in English: Surprise
in military systems and diplomatic systems : similarities and
differences : exemplary events: military surprise - the Yom-Kippur
War in 1973, and diplomatic surprise- peace initiative of Anwar
Sadat, Egyptian president in 1977
עבודת גמר (.M.A)
- אוניברסיטת תל-אביב, 2002
הערה ביב': כולל ביבליוגרפיה
נושאים - Subject
נושא: Tel Aviv
University -- Thesis.
Sadat, Anwar, 1918-1981 -- Thesis.
נושא: Surprise
(Military science) -- Middle East -- Thesis
Surprise -- Political aspects -- Middle East -- Thesis
Diplomacy -- Thesis
Israel-Arab War, 1973 -- Thesis
נושא: Egypt --
Politics and government -- 1970-1981 -- Thesis
Israel -- Politics and government -- 1973- -- Thesis
Israel -- Relations -- Egypt -- Thesis
Egypt -- Relations -- Israel -- Thesis
כותר נוסף: Surprise in
military systems and diplomatic systems
מחבר נוסף: Klumel,
Anat
מיקום: אוניברסיטת תל-אביב:
הספרייה למדעי החברה ולניהול
וספריית סוראסקי,
ספריית האוניברסיטה הפתוחה
ומכון הנרייטה סאלד.
עבודה זו נכתבה בהנחיית ד"ר שמעון נוה.
Shimon Naveh.
In pursuit of military excellence : the evolution of operational
theory
London : F. Cass, c1997
This book is an academic but readable work which analyses of the
development of what is known as "operational art", or in other
words, the intermediate field of theory, which connects strategy
with tactics. This is a relatively new and unfamiliar cognitive
field in the Western world, and has only been begun to be understood
since the late 1970's. Naveh combines complex theory within a
historical context, beginning with the doctrines of von Clausewitz,
continuing through the debacles of World War One and to the first
Revolution in Military Affairs which took place in the Soviet Red
Army of the 1920's. The latter half of the book concludes with the
development of operational thought in the US Army which began in
1976. This followed the realization in the US military that their
tactical doctrines provided no answer to the threats east of the
iron curtain. This process of thought culminated with the Gulf War,
which saw the successful implementation of the theory, independently
developed to that of the Red Army, but remarkably similair. This
book is unique, not in that it analyses operational theory, but in
that it outlines the pioneering processes that took place in the
Soviet Union during the 1920's and 30's. This information has
remained hidden and unknown to the West until only very recently,
and has been revealed here by the author who has researched the
field intensively.
ד"ר שמעון נוה כתב את הספר "אמנות
המערכה""(תרגום לעברית) . ספר זה מציע פרשנות
לתחום הביניים של הידע הצבאי, המוצב בין האסטרטגיה והטקטיקה - "אמנות
המערכה" - ועוקב אחר התפתחותה של המודעות המערכתית עד להתגבשותה לכדי
תאוריה רחבת ידיים.
שמעון נוה מזהה ארבעה ציוני דרך בהתפתחותה של תאורית המערכה:
* המחשבה הצבאית של המאה התשע-עשרה ושורשי הבורות המערכתית.
* הופעתו של רעיון הבליצקריג.
* התפתחותה של תאורית המערכה העמוקה הסובייטית במהלך שנות העשרים
והשלושים של המאה העשרים.
* התגבשותה, חמישים שנה מאוחר יותר, של תאורית המערכה הרב-מימדית
האמריקנית, אשר יושמה הלכה למעשה במלחמת המפרץ.
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